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Abstract Package bids, i.e., bids on sets of items, are an
essential aspect of combinatorial auctions. They can allow
bidders to accurately express their preferences. However,
bidders on packages consisting of few items are often
unable to outbid provisionally winning bids on large
packages. To resolve this, both coordination as well as
cooperation are needed. Coordination, since smaller bid-
ders need to bid on packages that are disjoint; cooperation,
since typically bid increases from more than one bidder are
required to overcome the threshold to outbid a larger
package bid. The authors design an information system that
supports the implementation of an iterative combinatorial
auction; this system is specifically aimed at helping bidders
overcome coordination and threshold problems. They study
the effect of information feedback on the behavior of
bidders in different auction settings. The authors test this in
an experimental setting using human bidders, varying
feedback from very basic information about provisionally
winning bids/prices, to providing more advanced concepts
such as winning and deadness levels, and coalitional
feedback. The experiment indicates that coalitional feed-
back has a positive impact on economic efficiency in cases
where difficult threshold problems arise; however, it
appears to have an adverse effect when threshold problems
are easy.
Keywords Auctions/bidding  Coordination and threshold
problems  Bidder support  Laboratory experiment
1 Introduction
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are allocation mechanisms
that enable selling and buying multiple (indivisible) items
simultaneously. In fact, CAs allow bidders to bid on sets of
items (packages) and the auctioneer can allocate any
package only in its entirety to the corresponding bidder.
CAs have established themselves as a viable allocation
mechanism in settings where market prices are not readily
available, and bidders have sub- or super-additive valua-
tions. CAs offer the possibility for a coalition of bids on
small packages to jointly outbid a single bidder’s claim on
the complete set of items. However, two hurdles need to be
overcome before a coalition can become winning.
(1) The coordination problem Bidders need to coordi-
nate their bids and bid on complementary (i.e., non-
overlapping) sets of items. The coordination chal-
lenge lies in bidders having to discover such a set of
individually profitable and collectively complemen-
tary packages, given that the number of possible
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packages rises exponentially with the number of
items. This is complicated by the existence of
cognitive limits on the number of packages people
can concentrate on during the auction. For instance,
experimental research by Scheffel et al. (2012)
indicates that bidders only bid on 6 to 10 different
packages, independent of the auction format,
although the bidders had a multitude of packages
with positive valuations to choose from. Coordina-
tion is hindered by the assumption that a bidder only
knows his/her private valuation for these packages,
and not the preferences of other bidders. In fact, in
order to mitigate collusion, it makes sense to restrict
communication between bidders (see e.g., Cramton
and Schwartz 2000).
(2) The threshold problem Even if the coordination
problem is overcome, the task of determining
appropriate bid prices to displace the currently
winning bid still remains. A complicating factor is
that each bidder in a coalition has an incentive not to
increase his/her bid. Indeed, the forgone revenue
from unilaterally increasing one’s bid falls entirely
on the cooperating bidder, whereas the benefits
extend to the non-cooperating bidders as well. Thus,
the problem of choosing an appropriate bid price is
non-trivial.
As far as we are aware, the term ‘‘threshold problem’’ was
coined by Rothkopf et al. (1998), although the problem
itself was mentioned already in e.g., Banks et al. (1989).
Several papers on CAs discuss the threshold problem
(e.g., Rothkopf et al. 1998; Day and Raghavan 2008;
Brunner et al. 2010; Scheffel et al. 2012; Chernomaz and
Levin 2012), however, in some cases the term ‘‘threshold
problem’’ is used as a container concept for both the
coordination and the threshold problem. Bichler et al.
(2017) point out that the coordination problem has largely
been ignored in the game-theoretical literature on CAs.
Both the coordination problem and the threshold prob-
lem are solved in the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) auction. Indeed, in the VCG auction, it is a weakly
dominant strategy for bidders to report their valuations
truthfully, which takes care of the threshold problem, and
hence to bid on all packages for which they have a positive
valuation, which deals with the coordination problem.
However, the VCG auction is rarely used in practice due to
a number of issues, such as very low auction revenues (see
Ausubel and Milgrom 2006). The VCG outcome is also not
necessarily a competitive equilibrium. Furthermore, there
is still the issue of cognitive limits, making it unrealistic
that bidders would effectively bid on each package they
value.
Even though the coordination and threshold problem are
also relevant in single round CAs, this paper focuses on
iterative, ascending CAs. An iterative auction consists of
multiple rounds, such that bidders can repeatedly increase
their bids and/or introduce new bids. Our paper discusses
the design of an information system for iterative CAs.
While bidders need to decide after every round which bids
to increase and by how much, given their valuations (which
is private information), they typically lack information to
be able to overcome the coordination and the threshold
problem. Hence, our main contribution is the development
of an information system that processes the bids, produces
detailed information on their status and prospects, and
shares this with the bidders as so-called feedback after each
round. We study the effect of different types of feedback
on bidder behavior and auction performance by reporting
the outcome of an experiment involving over 300 indi-
viduals. By varying feedback from providing only basic
information to a more substantial type of feedback (called
coalitional feedback), we are able to draw (statistically
significant) conclusions on how our information system
impacts auction performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we provide an overview of relevant literature dealing with
either feedback and/or experimental settings in CAs. Sec-
tion 3 gives the precise terminology. We describe a new
type of feedback (coalitional feedback) in Sect. 4. In
Sect. 5, we discuss the details of the iterative CA used in
our laboratory experiments, along with the experimental
design; the results are presented in Sect. 6.
2 Related Literature
CAs are big business, having several practical applications
ranging from the allocation of airport landing slots (Ras-
senti et al. 1982) or harbor time slots (Ignatius et al. 2014),
the allocation of spectrum licenses (Brunner et al. 2010;
Scheffel et al. 2012; Bichler et al. 2013), the allocation of
mineral/oil drilling rights (Cramton 2007), and real estate
(Goossens et al. 2014).
An early form of feedback is described by Banks et al.
(1989). They introduce a so-called ‘‘stand-by queue’’,
which allows bidders to publicly announce their willing-
ness to pay a certain price for a specific package. Bidders
can then use this information to express a bid which,
combined with one or more of the bids on the stand-by
queue, is able to outbid the currently winning bid. While a
stand-by queue can help to overcome the coordination
problem, it is less clear how it alleviates the threshold
problem. Nevertheless, there is some experimental evi-
dence suggesting that bidders were indeed able to coordi-
nate their bids using the stand-by queue and displace large
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package bids when the sum of the small bidders’ valuations
was higher than that of the large bidder (Bykowsky et al.
2000).
Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) introduce several
important concepts concerning feedback: deadness and
winning levels. In short, the former is the price a bidder
needs to bid to have any chance of becoming winning,
whereas the latter is the price that guarantees the bidder to
become winning if no other bids are increased. Their work
serves as a foundation for bidder support systems in CAs,
as it provides theoretical, algorithmic, and computational
results on deadness and winning levels.
Adomavicius et al. (2012) study how bidders behave in
continuous CAs. Their main objective is to study how
information feedback affects bidding behavior leading to
differences in the retained surplus of bidders. They used
baseline feedback (all bids displayed anonymously), out-
come feedback (provisional winning allocation) and price
feedback (deadness and winning levels). They find that
price feedback leads to higher efficiencies, fewer dead bids
and a higher percentage of winning bids when compared to
outcome and baseline feedback.
Petrakis et al. (2013) build on the work by Adomavicius
and Gupta (2005) and define and analyze computational
and game theoretical properties of deadness and winning
levels. They mention the threshold problem, and the fact
that often winning levels are too high for a single bidder to
outbid a large bidder. As a solution they briefly suggest
coalitional winning levels, which they introduce as per-
sonalized and non-linear ask prices in between deadness
and winning levels. The underlying idea is that the costs to
outbid the currently winning bid is shared among the bid-
ders in a losing coalition. However, they point out that
coalitional winning levels are computationally very chal-
lenging and do not change the free-rider incentive, and as
such they do not further expand on this concept. There is
game-theoretical research on this free-rider problem in
ascending CAs (see e.g., Sano 2012; Goeree and Lien
2014; Guler et al. 2016), that shows that ascending CAs
can lead to inefficient perfect Bayesian equilibria with risk-
neutral bidders. However, laboratory experiments have
shown that ascending combinatorial auctions consistently
achieve high allocative efficiencies, indicating that this
negative theoretical result does not seem to apply in
practical situations.
In a time-wise overlapping but independent study,
Bichler et al. (2017) introduce an ascending CA which
implements coalitional winning levels, where the cost
sharing is based on the Shapley value. It is important to
realize an essential difference with this paper: the coali-
tional winning levels in Bichler et al. (2017) are imple-
mented as a price rule. This means that bidders either
accept the suggested price, or are forced to drop out. In our
laboratory experiment (see Sect. 5), we use coalitional
winning levels as feedback, i.e., purely informative (bid-
ders can bid any price they prefer). Besides numerical
experiments, Bichler et al. (2017) perform lab experiments
with human participants on auction settings similar to the
one used by Adomavicius et al. (2012), allowing them to
compare results and to express causal statements about the
differences. The results of their experiments indicate high
economic efficiencies in ascending CAs with deadness and
winning level feedback, but even higher efficiencies if the
price rule based on coalitional winning levels is enforced,
in addition to giving deadness and winning levels. The
price rule also appears to lead to faster auctions. We
position this paper as a different set of experiments, with
different types of coalitional feedback in a different
experimental setting. Therefore, comparing our results with
these prior papers is impracticable.
3 Notation, Terminology, and Modeling
Our setting is an ascending, iterative CA consisting of
multiple rounds. Consider a set I ¼ f1; 2; . . .;mg of indi-
visible, unique items which are auctioned using a first price
(i.e., winning bidders pay the prices they bid) iterative CA,
and a set A ¼ f1; 2; . . .; ng of bidders that participate in the
CA. A bid b consists of three components: the bidder
aðbÞ 2 A expressing bid b, the package SðbÞ  I to which
bid b applies, and the price p(b) that bidder a(b) commu-
nicates for package S(b). Hence, we see a bid b as a triple
(a(b), S(b), p(b)), and we denote the set of bids by B ¼
fðaðbÞ; SðbÞ; pðbÞÞj bidder aðbÞ has expressed the willing-
ness to pay p(b) for package SðbÞg. Every bidder a 2 A has
a value vaðSÞ 0 for every subset S  I; this value vaðSÞ is
the private valuation of bidder a for the package S.
The winner determination problem (WDP) is now the
following: given the set of bids B, determine the allocation
of items to bidders that maximizes the sum of the prices of
the accepted bids, ensuring that each item is sold at most
once. An integer programming formulation of WDP, using
binary variables x(b) which are equal to one if and only if








xðbÞ 1 8 i 2 I
xðbÞ 2 f0; 1g 8 b 2 B
Given a set of bids B, an instance of the WDP follows. For
each solution x of this WDP, there is an allocation X ¼
fðaðbÞ; SðbÞÞjxðbÞ ¼ 1g indicating which bidder receives
what set(s) of items, and a corresponding set of winning
bids WðXÞ ¼ fb 2 BjxðbÞ ¼ 1g. Let X and W symbolize
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respectively the allocation and the set of winning bids
corresponding to an optimal solution of the WDP. The





, with xðbÞ denoting the opti-
mal values for the decision variables.
The value of an allocation X depends on the private
valuations of the bidders, and is denoted by
VðXÞ ¼
P
b2WðXÞ vaðbÞðSðbÞÞ. This value can be seen as
being distributed over the auctioneer on the one hand, and
the bidders on the other hand. We use the term auctioneer
surplus of an allocation X, denoted by AS(X), to represent
the revenue for the auctioneer: ASðXÞ ¼
P
b2WðXÞ pðbÞ,
which corresponds to the amount received by the auc-
tioneer. The bidders surplus of an allocation X, denoted by
BS(X), is defined as BSðXÞ ¼
P
b2WðXÞðvaðbÞðSðbÞÞ  pðbÞÞ.
Clearly, VðXÞ ¼ ASðXÞ þ BSðXÞ.
A particular allocation, called XE, is found when each
bidder bids his/her private valuation on each possible
package. The private valuations are an upper bound on the
bid prices in pay-what-you-bid auctions. Hence, the value
of this allocation, VðXEÞ is maximum over all allocations,
and we use this quantity to be able to define the economic
efficiency of any allocation X: EðXÞ ¼ VðXÞ=VðXEÞ.
Notice that 0EðXÞ 1. The economic efficiency of an
auction measures the total amount of achieved surplus
relative to the maximum obtainable surplus. It represents a
measure of social welfare. When the efficiency is 100%, no
participant in the auction, whether they are a bidder or the
auctioneer, can improve their situation without making
some other participant worse off. However, when the
efficiency is below 100%, there is still ‘money left on the
table’.
We refer to Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) for the
original treatment of the concepts presented in this para-
graph. Observe that in the course of an iterative, ascending
CA, a bid b 2 B can be in one of three states. The state of a
bid b depends on its corresponding price p(b). When we
vary p(b) from a low value, say 0, to a high value, the state
of the bid will start in a dead state, where the bid is cur-
rently not winning and has no chance of ever becoming a
winning bid. Next, at a specific value for p(b) called the
deadness level, the state will become live; the bid is cur-
rently not winning, but it could become winning in a fol-
lowing round, depending upon the new bids. Finally, at
another specific value called the winning level, the state
will become winning (i.e., the bid is provisionally win-
ning). This is depicted in Fig. 1.
The deadness level for a subset of items S  I, called
DL(S), is defined as the minimum price pmin, ceteris par-
ibus, that some bidder a 2 A has to bid on S such that the
resulting bid ða; S; pminÞ can become winning in some
future round.
The winning level for a subset of items S  I, called
WL(S), is defined as the minimum price that some bidder
a 2 A has to bid on package S so that that bid, ceteris
paribus, will become winning in the next round.
4 Coalitional Feedback
In this section, we discuss two types of coalitional feed-
back. The section closes with a numerical example.
4.1 Factual Coalitional Feedback
In this section, we describe a new type of feedback, called
factual coalitional feedback (FCFB), which is explicitly
designed to overcome coordination problems in CAs. The
value of FCFB lies in the information we provide to a
bidder with a non-winning bid regarding the existence of
other bids that potentially can help to jointly become
(provisionally) winning. This information gives a bidder an
idea whether or not there is still potential in raising the bid
price of the currently non-winning bid. FCFB answers the
question ‘‘how many other bids exist that complement my
bid, and what is, ceteris paribus, the additional amount
needed?’’
We now describe how to obtain factual coalitional
feedback. First, consider a non-winning bid b 2 B. When
calculating the winning level for b, i.e., WLðSðbÞÞ, we also
find a coalition of bids, referred to as N(b), that consists of
‘newcomers’, i.e., bids that were not winning before, but
become winning together with b. More formally, this
coalition is defined as NðbÞ ¼ ðb [WðI n SðbÞÞÞnW, and
the number of bids in that coalition is |N(b)|. Next, if
jNðbÞj[ 1, the following message goes out to all bids in
N(b): ‘‘If |N(b)| bids, including this one, are collectively
raised by ðWLðSðbÞÞ  pðbÞÞ, these |N(b)| bids become
winning.’’ Thus, all bidders in |N(b)| face the same ‘in-
crement’, i.e., ðWLðSðbÞÞ  pðbÞÞ. A single bid receives
such a feedback message each time it appears in an allo-
cation that makes some non-winning bid winning, thus it is
possible to receive multiple such messages for a single bid.
Clearly, FCFB is a potential remedy against coordina-
tion problems. Indeed, when deciding upon a new bid, a
bidder can now consider, in addition to their private
Deadness level Winning level
Winning stateLive stateDead state
Bid price0
Fig. 1 Bid states
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valuation, the size of the coalition, and the suggested
‘increment’.
4.2 Suggestive Coalitional Feedback
Suggestive coalitional feedback (SCFB), goes one step
further than FCFB, and adds a concrete bid suggestion in
addition to the feedback given with FCFB. As such, SCFB
is designed to combat both coordination and threshold
problems. With SCFB, a bid b for a set of items S(b) will
receive feedback in the following manner: ‘‘If |N(b)| bids,
including this one, are collectively raised by
ðWLðSðbÞÞ  pðbÞÞ, these |N(b)| bids become winning. We
suggest you bid pðbÞ þ ðWLðSðbÞÞ  pðbÞÞ=jNðbÞj.’’ The
same message also goes out to the other bidders in N(b).
Suggestive coalitional feedback solves the questions ‘‘are
there other bids that complement my bid?’’ and ‘‘what
price should I bid, so that I become winning instead of the
currently winning bid(s)?’’ There are many ways to give a
concrete bid suggestion and they all have advantages and
disadvantages. For example, one could look at the current
bid prices and suggest an amount proportional to that. The
idea is then to suggest a higher bid price to bids that are
high already. The disadvantage of this approach is that a
bidder with a relatively low private value, that bids rela-
tively close to this private value, can get a suggestion that
is too high. Another approach is to take into account the
number of items in the bids, or even incorporate the
Shapley value (Bichler et al. 2017). However, these sort of
technicalities often make it unnecessarily difficult for
bidders to understand what is going on in the feedback. For
that reason, we opted for a concrete suggestion that divides
the increment equally among the bidders in the coalition.
We remark that this may not always be perceived as fair,
e.g., for coalitions consisting of bidders where the ratio of
the highest to lowest bid price is very high. However, for
the valuations we use (described in Sect. 5.2.2), this ratio is
never extreme. Note that it is again possible to receive
multiple feedback messages for a single bid, one message
for every time it occurs in an allocation that makes some
non-winning bid winning. Also note that it is possible that
the concrete bid suggestion exceeds the bidder’s private
valuation for the corresponding set of items. In practice this
is unavoidable; the auctioneer does not know the private
valuations.
Finally note that coalitional feedback, both the factual
and the suggestive variants, give no concrete suggestion as
to which package of items to bid on. Instead, it takes into
account previously made bids, and informs the bidder
about coordination opportunities, and in case of suggestive
coalitional feedback adds a price suggestion. In other
words: bidders still need to find packages that are of
interest to them (i.e., where they can get a positive bidders
surplus), but coordination and cooperation with other bid-
ders becomes easier. Receiving multiple (viable) feedback
messages for one bid could be interpreted by the bidder as a
realistic prospect of becoming a winner with that package,
and persuade him/her to raise his/her bid on that package,
rather than on other packages for which no coalitional
feedback message was received. Nevertheless, the number
of potential coalitions also needs some consideration.
Given that the number of possible coalitions is exponential
in the number of bids, the number of potential feedback
messages is of the same order. Depending on the setting,
limiting the number of coalitions, e.g., by considering
coalitions of live bids and/or some number of ’most
promising coalitions’ (i.e., those with the lowest required
increments), can make sense.
4.3 Numerical Example
Consider some round in an iterative ascending combina-
torial auction with 6 bidders and 3 items (A, B, and C). The
set of bids is presented in Table 1. The columns respec-
tively contain the bidder a(b), the bid price p(b), the
package S(b), the deadness level DL(S(b)), and finally the
winning level WL(S(b)). A * in the deadness level column
indicates that the bid currently is not dead (i.e., the bid is
live). A * in the winning level column indicates that the bid
is currently winning.
Bidder 1 has the (provisionally) winning bid. Bidders 2
to 5 each have live bids, so any of these could be picked up
in a winning coalition. Bidder 6’s bid is a dead bid and will
hence never be part of any winning allocation: there is
always a better alternative to selecting the bid by bidder 6.
Bidder 2’s bid will receive the following factual coali-
tional feedback: ‘‘If 2 bids, including this one, are collec-
tively raised by 10, these 2 bids become winning.’’ It is not
hard to see that the coalition induced by bidder 2’s bid
consists of that bid and bidder 5’s bid. In fact, bidder 5 will
receive the same message. There is, however, a second
potentially viable coalition that consists of the bids by
Table 1 A set of bids and their corresponding deadness levels and
winning levels
a(b) p(b) S(b) DLðSðbÞÞ WLðSðbÞÞ
1 80 {A,B,C} 80* 80*
2 50 {A,B} 50* 60
3 20 {A} 20* 40
4 20 {B} 20* 40
5 20 {C} 20* 30
6 30 {A,B} 50 60
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bidders 3, 4, and 5. They will get the following factual
coalitional feedback message: ‘‘If 3 bids, including this
one, are collectively raised by 20, these 3 bids become
winning.’’ Bidders 2, 3, and 4 are each present in one
viable coalition, and hence receive one feedback message.
Bidder 5’s bid, however, is present in two viable coalitions,
and will receive two messages corresponding to those
coalitions: a smaller coalition consisting of 2 bids that faces
an increment of 10 and a larger coalition consisting of 3
bids that faces an increment of 20.
5 Methodology
5.1 Experimental Design
To experimentally study the effect of feedback on the
bidders’ ability to overcome coordination and threshold
problems, we set up iterative CAs in a lab using the z-Tree
software (Fischbacher 2007). In these auctions, bidders
compete to acquire a number of items, and are allowed to
bid on any subset of the items (see Sect. 5.2.1). We impose
no limit on the number of bids that a bidder can submit, nor
do we impose any activity rules. We use a minimum bid
increment of 1, and only allow bids lower than or equal to
the relevant private valuation. This eliminates gaming
behavior; bidders can no longer incur possible losses. More
details on the private valuations is given in Sect. 5.2.2.
We opted for an OR-bids bidding language, which
means that given a number of bids from a bidder, the
auctioneer can accept any non-overlapping set of these bids
and charge the sum of the specified prices (see e.g., Nisan
2000). The XOR-bidding language would be a more
expressive alternative, but, as stated in both Brunner et al.
(2010) and Scheffel et al. (2012), XOR-bidding can lead to
problems if bidders only submit few bids. Indeed, a low
number of bids often leads to a number of unsold items,
which may have a considerable impact on efficiency. Since
we use super-additive valuations in our laboratory experi-
ments, the OR-bids bidding language is well suited.
The auction proceeds in rounds, until two consecutive
rounds occur in which the total auction revenue does not
increase compared to the previous round. In other words, if
three consecutive auction rounds lead to the same revenue,
the auction closes. When that happens, the provisionally
winning allocation becomes the final winning allocation.
This closing rule effectively eliminates sniping strategies,
where bidders suddenly make (higher) bids in the last
round. On the other hand, it might lead to an extreme
number of rounds, as bidders could still opt to do nothing
as long as the auction has not resulted in consecutive
rounds with the same revenue. However, in our experi-
ments we encountered no such adverse effects.
The experimental design is presented in Table 2, and
involves 3 factors: structure (STR), valuation (VAL), and
feedback (FB). We refer to Sect. 5.2 for a detailed dis-
cussion of these factors. A row in Table 2 corresponds to
an experimental session. An experimental session consists
of 4 groups, one for every level of the factor structure.
Every group in an experimental session is called an
experimental unit. An experimental unit consists of a series
of 4 consecutive auctions with the same set of participants,
and contains 1 auction for each feedback level. Each entry
in Table 2 corresponds to an auction; for instance the entry
‘‘3;4’’ refers to an auction where the factor valuation equals
3, and the factor feedback equals 4. A total of 192 auctions
were held. Every session requires 27 subjects (one exper-
imental unit consisting of 4 subjects, two experimental
units consisting of 7 subjects, and one experimental unit
consisting of 9 subjects), hence the total number of
required participants for 12 sessions is 324.
The design is between-subject for the factor structure,
and within-subject for the factors valuation and feedback.
In addition, all 24 permutations of the 4 feedback levels
occur exactly twice, all threshold levels occur at least once
per experimental unit and any two consecutive valuation
levels within an experimental unit are distinct. We note that
specifically in the experimental units corresponding to
STR4, there are no auctions using a VAL level of 3.
A printout of the instructions (which can be found in the
appendix, available online via http://www.springerlink.
com) was handed out to every participant in the beginning
of the experiment. All participants worked their way
through the instructions and filled in a set of test questions.
Participants were free to ask questions. Once all subjects
were done filling in the test questions, and when all those
questions were answered correctly, the auctions started. In
every session, the same experimenter was present, and all
the experiments were held in the same room. Students
received a bonus point on the exam of a course they had to
take for showing up, and a monetary incentive that
depended on performance in the auctions. Performance is
measured by the difference between the private values and
the prices paid for the final winning bids. On average, the
participants earned €9.62.
5.2 Factors of the Experiment
In this section we discuss the different factors (independent
variables) in our experimental design.
5.2.1 The Factor Structure (STR)
We use four different item/bidder structures, as shown in
Fig. 2a and b. The item structures are similar to settings in
Kazumori (2010), Scheffel et al. (2011), and Vangerven
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et al. (2017). Bidders need not bid on sets of adjacent
items, however, their valuations (see Sect. 5.2.2) are such
that if complementarity effects exist, they involve adjacent
items.
Combining both the number of items and bidders, we
obtain what we refer to as the factor structure. The factor
structure has four levels: 3 items with 4 bidders (STR1), 3
items with 7 bidders (STR2), 6 items with 7 bidders
(STR3), and 6 items with 9 bidders (STR4).
We remark that subjects are randomly assigned to an
auction, and stay in the same level of the factor structure
during four consecutive auctions. In other words: four
consecutive auctions in a session with the same level of
structure have the same subjects.
5.2.2 The Factor Valuation (VAL)
With the valuation structure, we aim to obtain auction
settings that give rise to coordination and threshold prob-
lems. For each structure, there are a number of small bid-
ders who are interested in different items and 1 large bidder
who is mainly interested in a package containing all items.
Each small bidder has one favorite item. The valuations of
the other individual items depend on how close they are to
that item: valuations for adjacent items decrease by 50%
with each step they are further away from the item of main
interest. The valuations for the small bidders are purely
additive. The large bidder’s valuation for the complete
package is generated first. With super-additivities of 20%
for every additional adjacent item, we calculate the valu-
ations for all possible subsets of items. The large bidder’s
valuation for the complete package equals the sum over all
individual items of their highest valuation by a small bid-
der, multiplied with a factor W. We discern three levels for
the valuation factor, depending on W.
• VAL1: W 2 ½106%; 108%. The large bidder has the
upper hand, hence, no coordination is required to
obtain an efficient outcome. We expect coalitions of
small bidders to face a threshold problem they
cannot overcome, since their valuations are not high
enough. Still, it remains interesting to see how far
the small bidders will boost the price for the large
bidder.
• VAL2: W 2 ½93%; 95%. Here, coalitions of smaller
bidders have a small advantage over the large bidder.
We expect a difficult threshold problem. Coordination
is required to obtain an efficient allocation.
• VAL3: W 2 ½80%; 82%. An efficient allocation
requires small bidders to coordinate. However, as the
valuation of such coalition amply exceeds the valuation
of the large bidder, we anticipate an easy threshold
problem.
With the resulting valuations, we avoid situations where
the equal split rule used in the suggestive coalitional
feedback creates situations that can be perceived as unfair.
We created two sets of private values for every
Table 2 Experimental sessions: first number in an experimental unit represents the VAL level, second number represents the FB level
Session STR1 STR2 STR3 STR4
1 1;1 2;2 1;3 3;4 2;3 3;4 1;1 3;2 1;4 3;3 1;2 2;1 1;3 2;4 2;2 2;1
2 1;2 2;3 1;4 3;1 2;1 1;3 3;2 2;4 1;2 2;4 3;3 1;1 2;2 1;4 2;1 1;3
3 1;3 3;4 2;1 3;2 2;4 3;2 2;3 1;1 3;4 2;3 3;1 1;2 1;2 2;1 2;3 1;4
4 1;4 3;2 1;1 2;3 3;1 2;4 1;3 2;2 2;1 1;4 2;3 3;2 1;1 2;3 1;2 2;4
5 2;1 1;2 3;3 2;4 2;2 1;4 3;1 1;3 2;2 1;3 2;1 3;4 2;1 2;3 2;4 1;2
6 2;2 1;1 2;4 3;3 3;2 2;1 3;3 1;4 1;3 3;2 1;1 2;4 1;4 2;1 1;3 2;2
7 2;3 3;1 2;2 1;4 3;3 1;2 2;1 3;4 1;1 3;4 2;2 3;3 2;1 2;2 1;4 2;3
8 2;4 3;3 1;2 2;1 3;4 1;1 2;2 3;3 3;2 2;1 1;4 2;3 2;3 2;4 2;2 1;1
9 3;1 2;4 3;2 1;3 1;2 2;3 1;4 3;1 2;3 1;1 3;2 1;4 2;4 2;2 1;1 2;3
10 3;2 1;4 2;3 1;1 1;4 3;1 1;2 2;3 3;1 2;2 3;4 1;3 2;3 1;1 2;4 2;2
11 3;3 2;1 3;4 1;2 1;3 2;2 3;4 2;1 2;4 3;1 1;3 2;2 2;4 1;2 2;3 2;1
12 3;4 1;3 3;1 2;2 1;1 3;3 2;4 1;2 3;3 1;2 2;4 3;1 2;2 1;3 2;1 2;4
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3
Item 4 Item 5 Item 6
(b)
(a)
6 items and either
7 or 9 bidders.
3 items and either
4 or 7 bidders.
Fig. 2 Item and bidder structure
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combination of STR and VAL, leading to a total of 24
different sets of private values.1
Finally, we remark that participants are not told their
role (e.g., small bidder) or that of others; they simply
discover their private valuations by clicking on packages.
The values are private, but participants are informed that
all values are at least additive. Participants take part in
consecutive auctions, but valuations (roles) rotate between
these auctions.
5.2.3 The Factor Feedback (FB)
The third factor in our laboratory experiments is feedback.
Feedback is calculated after every round and communi-
cated to the bidders. We use a hierarchy of feedback
involving four levels, as depicted in Fig. 3. The first level,
outcome feedback (FB1), consists of showing the (provi-
sionally) winning allocation along with the prices corre-
sponding to that allocation. The second feedback level
(FB2) consists of the feedback given in FB1, and adds
winning and deadness levels. We call this bid states
feedback. Another layer up the hierarchy, in FB3, we add
factual coalitional feedback on top of the feedback given in
FB2. The fourth feedback level (FB4) adds a concrete bid
suggestion, suggestive coalitional feedback, in addition to
the feedback given in FB2. Feedback regarding a particular
subset of the items is displayed if the bidder clicks on that
subset.
Our coalitional feedback bears some resemblance to the
price rule based on coalitional winning levels used in
Bichler et al. (2017). As discussed in Sect. 2, there are a
number of differences on the implementation level. (1) In
Bichler et al. (2017), the coalitional pricing rule is calcu-
lated for currently losing bidders, but in their experiments
the price rule for a bid follows from one coalition,
specifically the coalition with the lowest price suggestion
for that bid. In our experiments, we allow for multiple
messages to be displayed, because it is possible that the
lowest suggested amount corresponds to a coalition that
faces a threshold they simply cannot bridge given their
valuation. Moreover, we want to make sure that when one
coalition member receives a price suggestion, all other
members whose collaboration is required also receive this
suggestion. (2) In our versions of coalitional feedback we
only consider coalitions of live bids for feedback. Disre-
garding coalitions that include dead bids has the advantage
of limiting the number of feedback suggestions, and
requiring bidders to first bid past their respective deadness
levels. It also encourages activity in the auction, without
actually requiring an explicit activity rule.
6 Results
We report the results of 192 auctions, involving 324 dif-
ferent subjects (students at the Faculty of Economics and
Business), carried out at KU Leuven.
6.1 Validation
Before we start discussing the outcome of the experiment,
it makes sense to first validate whether the experimental
design resulted in the coordination and threshold problems
we anticipated, and whether it aligns with what is reported
in the literature on cognitive limits.
6.1.1 The Realized Coordination and Threshold Problem
In order to validate whether the experimental settings
indeed led to coordination and threshold problems, we
make use of measures for both problems described in
Vangerven (2017). The Coordination Index (CI) is a
measure for the magnitude of the coordination problem,
and basically looks at the total relative loss in economic
efficiency if each bidder bids his/her true valuation on his/
her k most valuable packages, for k ranging from 1 to a
value kmax for which an efficient allocation is obtained. The
larger CI, the larger the coordination challenge present in
the auction. The Threshold Index (TI) for a coalition of
non-winning bids boils down to the ratio of the price
increase that this coalition jointly needs in order to win, to
the margin this coalition has, taking into account the pri-
vate valuations and current bid prices. A higher value for
TI corresponds to a more severe threshold problem. If
TI[ 1, the non-winning coalition cannot outbid the cur-
rently winning bids (without exceeding private valuations);
this situation is called an insurmountable threshold
problem.
We have computed the realized CI and TI values for
each auction. Since we found that auctions using STR1 and
STR2 (3 items) are very similar with respect to CI and TI,
we have grouped them. The same applies for STR3 and
STR4 (6 items). Moreover, for auctions with VAL1, all
FB1: outcome feedback
FB2: bid states
FB3: factual coalitional feedback
FB4: suggestive coalitional feedback
Fig. 3 Feedback hierarchy
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item/bidder structures resulted in similar TI and CI values.
The average CI and TI values are given in Table 3.
Since the highest valuation in VAL1 is that of the large
bidder for the complete package, it is logical that CI equals
0. For STR1 and STR2, we find easy coordination chal-
lenges for both VAL2 and VAL3. On the other hand STR3
and STR4 lead to difficult coordination problems, in par-
ticular for VAL3.
Note that we calculated TI from the perspective of the
small bidders, namely, we look at the highest value coali-
tion of small bidders versus the large package bidder. The
results reported in Table 3 are averaged over every auction
that has such a TI value (not all auctions have TI values to
compute if the coalitions mentioned above were not pre-
sent). Overall, the TI values show that the threshold
problems we wanted to create, were indeed present. For
VAL1, we see a TI value that, on average, is almost equal
to 1. Considering that there were auctions in which the
coalition of smaller bidders all bid up to their private
valuation but did not win, and hence did not have a TI
value, this TI value indeed seems to correspond to insur-
mountable threshold problems for a coalition of small
bidders. For VAL2, we find an average TI value of 0.25,
and for VAL3 we find a value of 0.11, corresponding to
difficult and easy threshold problems respectively. This
also looks to be in line with the expectations sketched in
Sect. 5.2.2.
For the remainder of this paper, we use the following
notation:
• C0T" includes all settings with VAL1, corresponding
to an insurmountable threshold problem,
• CT? includes all settings with VAL2 and STR1-2,
corresponding to an easy coordination problem and a
difficult threshold problem,
• C?T? includes all settings with VAL2 and STR3-4,
corresponding to a difficult coordination problem and a
difficult threshold problem,
• CT includes all settings with VAL3 and STR1-2,
corresponding to an easy coordination problem and an
easy threshold problem,
• C?T- includes all settings with VAL3 and STR3-4,
corresponding to a difficult coordination problem and
an easy threshold problem.
6.1.2 Cognitive Limits
Figure 4 depicts the average number of different packages
a bidder bids on per round. This excludes the bids entered
in the first round, as bidders are then still discovering their
private valuations and enter a lot of bids. This result con-
firms the findings of Kagel et al. (2010) and Scheffel et al.
(2012), who observe that bidders usually bid on a limited
number of different packages, independent of the auction
format. Furthermore, it shows that bidder support in the
form of feedback FB2-4 reduces the number of packages
bidders bid on in an auction for those settings with difficult
coordination problems, or if the threshold problem is
insurmountable. Bidders can focus on fewer packages, and
still achieve higher efficiencies and revenues compared to
basic outcome feedback (see Sect. 6.2). If the coordination
problem is easy, feedback does not seem to impact the
number of packages that bidders track.
6.2 Observations
We discuss the results of our experiments in terms of
economic efficiency, bid prices, auction revenue, bidders
surplus, and auction duration.
6.2.1 Economic Efficiency
Overall, efficiencies were quite high. Figure 5 has box
plots showing the efficiency per level of feedback. We see
that in the cases where only basic feedback is given (FB1)
efficiencies show the highest degree of dispersion. This
indicates that simply showing the (provisionally) winning
allocation as feedback is often insufficient for bidders to
find an efficient outcome. The difference between FB1 on
the one hand, and FB2-4 on the other hand is striking: it
seems deadness and winning levels are important in guid-
ing bidders to an efficient outcome. The FB2, FB3 and FB4
Table 3 Mean CI; TI values for each combination of the factors STR
and VAL
VAL1 VAL2 VAL3
STR1-2 0.00 0.98 0.20 0.25 0.63 0.12
STR3-4 1.96 0.24 7.73 0.09











Fig. 4 Average number of bids entered per bidder per round
(excluding round 1) on unique packages
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box plots look similar, although FB3 and FB4 show a
couple of outliers.
We use the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test to examine the differences in efficiencies. The notation
	, 	 and 	 respectively denote a difference at 10%, 5%
and 1% significance level, and 
 denotes we cannot reject
the null hypothesis.
Onservation 1 Efficiencies ranked by Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests:
FB1 	 ðFB2 
 FB3 
 FB4Þ
At .01 significance level, we conclude that the efficiencies
obtained under FB1 are lower than those obtained under
FB2, FB3, and FB4. At .1 significance level, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the efficiencies obtained under
FB2, FB3, and FB4 come from the same distribution.
In order to obtain a more detailed understanding of these
results, we check whether the degree of coordination and
threshold problems has an impact. Table 4 contains the
mean efficiencies per feedback level, for each of the 5
auction settings. Box plots for efficiency per feedback level
for the 5 auction settings are given in the online appendix.
In the insurmountable threshold case, COT", we see that
efficiencies are almost always 100%, i.e., the large bidders
win when they should win, no matter the feedback. In the
difficult threshold cases, FB3 and FB4 fare better than FB1
and FB2: the average efficiency is higher, and the spread is
lower. This difference is striking in the case when the
coordination problem is easy (CT?). This indicates that
coalitional feedback offers added value to overcome the
threshold problem. When the coordination problem is hard,
FB3-4 loses its advantage compared to FB2. In the CT
case, FB4 actually performs worse than FB2, for which –
remarkably – all auctions ended efficiently. These obser-
vations are confirmed by Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests.
Onservation 2 Table 5 contains the efficiencies ranked
by Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests.
For COT", we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
efficiencies obtained under FB1, FB2, FB3, and FB4 come
from the same distribution.
For CTþ; at .1 significance level, we conclude that the
efficiencies obtained under coalitional feedback (FB3 and
FB4) are larger than those obtained under FB1 and FB2.
For CT; at .1 significance level, we conclude that the
efficiencies obtained under FB2 are larger than those
obtained under FB4.
In settings with a high coordition problem (CþTþ and
CþT), at .1 significance level, we conclude that the
efficiencies obtained under FB1 are lower than those
obtained under FB2, FB3 and FB4.
Figure 6 depicts the proportion of auctions that ended
efficiently. Overall, FB1 shows the lowest percentage of
efficient auctions, however, the difference is particularly
notable for the settings with hard coordination problems
(not a single auction ended efficiently in the C?T case).
Comparing coalitional feedback (FB3 and FB4) with bid
states feedback (FB2), the former performs better in the
CT? case, and nearly identical in the cases with hard
coordination problems.
6.2.2 Bid Prices
Table 6 presents the average ratio of the bid prices to their
private valuations for all expressed bids. Table 7 contains
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests.









Fig. 5 FB box plots
Table 4 Mean E(X)
COT" CT? CT C?T? C?T
FB1 0.986 0.979 0.989 0.976 0.927
FB2 0.999 0.985 1.00 0.978 0.995
FB3 0.986 0.993 0.989 0.986 0.963
FB4 0.988 0.993 0.975 0.979 0.982







 FB2Þ 	 ðFB3 
 FB4Þ
CT FB4 	 FB2
C?T? FB1 	 ðFB2 
 FB3 
 FB4Þ
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Onservation 3 In COT" we see that with more feedback,
bidders on average bid a higher percentage of their private
valuations. In cases with a difficult threshold problem
ðCTþ and CþTþÞ; we see that when FB3-4 is given, bid-
ders on average bid higher compared to FB1-2 cases. In
this case, the coalitional feedback appears to convince
bidders to bid higher. This is not the case for the settings
with easy threshold problems, in fact, for CþTaverage bid
prices are lower for FB3-4, compared to when FB1-2 is
given.
6.2.3 Auction Revenue
Table 8 contains the mean auction revenue (i.e., the auc-
tioneer surplus). We see that revenues in auctions with an
easy threshold problem (CT and C?T) are clearly
lower than in auctions with a difficult threshold problem.
We have seen in Sect. 6.2.2 that especially in the CT
setting small bidders do not bid high compared to their
private valuations. Indeed, in this setting they have plenty
of margin to outbid the package bidder, and given the easy
coordination and threshold problem, they seem to realize
this quickly in the auction, which impacts the auction
revenue (Table 9).
Examining the box plots of auction revenue for the
various feedback levels (Fig. 7), we notice little difference
between feedback levels 2, 3 and 4. Restricting the bidders
to outcome feedback (FB1), however, does reduce the
auction revenue, as is confirmed by Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests.
Onservation 4 Auction revenues ranked by Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests:
FB1 	 ðFB2 
 FB3 
 FB4Þ
At .05 significance level, we conclude that the auction
revenues obtained under FB1 are lower than those
obtained under FB2, FB3, and FB4. At .1 significance
level, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the revenues
obtained under FB2, FB3, and FB4 come from the same
distribution.
In line with Observation 3, in cases with a difficult
threshold problem ðCTþand CþTþÞ; we see that when
FB3-4 is given, revenues are higher compared to FB1-2
cases. This is not so much the case for the settings with
easy threshold problems.












Fig. 6 Proportion of efficient auctions
Table 6 Average bid as percentage of private valuations
COT" CT? CT C?T? C?T
FB1 0.812 0.812 0.821 0.847 0.840
FB2 0.842 0.786 0.790 0.853 0.862
FB3 0.839 0.811 0.804 0.863 0.828
FB4 0.821 0.845 0.783 0.857 0.821













C?T? FB2 	 FB3, FB4 	 FB3
C?T FB3 	 FB2
Table 8 Mean auction revenue
COT" CT? CT C?T? C?T
FB1 0.929 0.915 0.850 0.919 0.844
FB2 0.943 0.962 0.864 0.930 0.918
FB3 0.919 0.951 0.874 0.937 0.838
FB4 0.929 0.955 0.849 0.938 0.873






CT? FB1 	 ðFB2 
 FB3 





C?T? FB1 	 FB4
C?T (FB1 
 FB2Þ 	 FB3
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6.2.4 Bidders Surplus
Table 10 contains the percentage of available surplus that
goes to the bidders, i.e., BSðXÞ=VðXEÞ and Table 11 con-
tains the results of the Willcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests.
Onservation 5 In the cases with difficult threshold
problems, the highest bidder profits are obtained when FB1
is provided. However, in these settings efficiency was much
lower than with feedback FB3-4. Hence, what happened
there is that large bidders received the total BS when it was
not economically efficient for them to receive any surplus
at all. In CTþ; bidders obtained a larger share of the
potential surplus with coalitional feedback (FB3-4),
compared to bid states feedback (FB2), combined with a
higher efficiency (see Table 4).
6.2.5 Auction Duration
Table 12 contains the mean number of auction rounds for
each feedback level. Auctions with FB2-4 seem to last a
few more rounds on average than auctions with FB1, where
not a lot of coordination is possible between bidders.
Furthermore, we notice that in case of an insurmount-
able threshold problem (COT"), the number of rounds
under FB1 is lower compared to the other settings, for all
levels of feedback. Apparently, it becomes clear to the
small bidders that they will not be able to win relatively
quickly, compared to the other auction settings where the
small bidders indeed have better odds. Furthermore, ceteris
paribus, increasing the difficulty of the coordination
problem increases the required number of rounds for FB3
and FB4.
The average round duration (in seconds) is provided in
Table 13. In cases with a difficult coordination problem
(C?T and C?T?), bidders seem to need more time per
round than in cases with an easy coordination problem,
especially for FB1. This can be explained by the fact that
bidders need to click on several itemsets to explore their
options and to compose individually profitable and col-
lectively complementary packages. In particular in the case
with FB1, they receive little or no guidance for this task.
Apparently, finding a promising itemset to bid on is more
time-consuming than deciding on the amount with which to









Fig. 7 Auction revenue box plots
Table 10 Average percentage of surplus obtained by the bidders
(BSðXÞ=VðXEÞ)
COT" CT? CT C?T? C?T
FB1 0.057 0.064 0.139 0.057 0.084
FB2 0.056 0.023 0.136 0.048 0.076
FB3 0.067 0.042 0.115 0.049 0.125
FB4 0.059 0.038 0.125 0.042 0.109


















 FB2Þ 	 FB3
Table 12 Mean number of rounds per auction
COT" CT? CT C?T? C?T
FB1 6.4 8.0 6.8 6.8 7.8
FB2 8.5 10.3 7.8 8.8 10.5
FB3 6.7 9.1 8.4 10.3 10.3
FB4 6.8 9.1 11.0 10.2 17
Table 13 Mean auction duration (seconds) per round
COT" CT? CT C?T? C?T
FB1 154 128 138 194 154
FB2 138 116 128 174 160
FB3 184 113 125 151 145
FB4 170 128 97 162 121
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increase the current bid. Apart from the setting with an
insurmountable threshold problem (COT"), FB3 and FB4
manage to reduce the mean round duration.
6.3 Discussion
In our results, we find little difference between factual
coalitional feedback (FB3) and suggestive coalitional
feedback (FB4). Apparently, the price suggestion, which
consists of evenly splitting the required increment among
the bidders in the coalition, did not make a difference
compared to simply stating the increment and the number
of bidders in the coalition. One explanation could be that
the participants simply came up with the same idea about
the price they should bid in the next round when confronted
with the factual feedback.
It should not be surprising that FB4 has added value
compared to FB2 for threshold problems in cases where
winning levels (WL) exceed private valuations (PV).
However, if the coalitional feedback price suggestion
(CFB) offered by FB4 is such that CFB is lower than WL
and at the same time WL\PV, it persuades bidders
towards smaller bid increments. This could either lead to
an increase in the number of rounds, or – in case of an
abrupt stopping rule - the auction could close with a less
efficient outcome (when compared to FB2). In what fol-
lows, we provide a detailed explanation for this, for every
level of Coordination/Threshold.
When the threshold problem is insurmountable (COT"),
aside from some outliers, feedback does not have a real
impact on who will be the winning bidder. However, when
FB2-4 is applied the package bidder has a harder time
because the competition with the smaller bidders, even
though they cannot win, is stronger. This leads to the
package bidder having to bid higher prices, as is reflected
in the higher auctioneer revenue results. In this case, FB3
and FB4 have no added value compared to FB2 in terms of
efficiency or revenue. The reason for this is twofold: a
substantial amount of the feedback messages of FB4 is
either (1) ‘‘useless’’ (i.e., CFB[ PV), as seen in Table 14
and/or (2) sent to bidders that at that time have at least one
provisionally winning bid, as seen in Table 15. In the
former case bidders will not be able to follow the feedback
and in the latter case bidders might not be willing to follow
the suggestion. After all, they already have a provisional
winning bid.
In cases with a considerable threshold problem, the
coalitional feedback appears to convince bidders to bid
higher, which leads to higher efficiencies. If FB1 is applied,
the highest bidder profits are obtained: this is an indication
of the threshold problem: in cases where the efficiency is
not 100%, the large package bidders receive the total
bidders surplus while it is not economically efficient for
them to receive any surplus at all. When more feedback is
given, total bidder profits decrease, yet efficiencies
improve as bidders are better able to coordinate and com-
pete with the large package bidder. Indeed, one would
expect FB3 and FB4 to be more effective than FB2 in cases
where the winning levels are restrictively high, i.e., greater
than the private values of losing bidders, and hence the
information is not of much use to bidders. In such a case,
FB3 and more so FB4 have the largest potential effect
because of the new information they provide. This happens
more often in difficult threshold cases. Indeed, in Tables 14
and 15 we respectively see that in CT? and C?T? the
highest proportion of messages are useful and go out to
current non-winning bidders.
In easy threshold cases, FB2 performs better than FB4
with regards to efficiency. It seems that FB4 (sometimes)
prevents the small bidders from bidding what they should
bid to win the auction. The explanation for this phe-
nomenon is threefold. First, FB4 is rarely an added value
compared to WL. Table 14 shows that in only around 10 to
13% of the messages sent out in auctions with an easy
threshold problem, the coalitional feedback has an added
value compared to winning levels. Second, in the case
useful coalitional feedback is sent, it most often goes out to
current winners instead of non-winners, as can be seen in
Table 15. Third, if useful FB4 feedback is sent out, the
bidders in fact get the message that they could also win by
bidding (much?) less than the winning level. If only some
of the bidders in a losing coalition follow this advice, the
auction requires more rounds. Moreover, given our
potentially abrupt stopping rule, the auction could stop
prematurely.
Table 14 Average percentage
of useful and useless FB4
messages
The remainder of the messages
fall in a category where both







Table 15 Average percentage of useful FB4 messages that go out to
current (non-)winners
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Overall, with respect to speed of convergence, our
coalitional feedback often provokes more rounds than
similar settings with bid state or outcome feedback. In
some cases, this brings an increase in efficiency or revenue.
However, we notice a substantial drop in the mean duration
of a round, which reflects that our feedback reduces the
time the bidders spend exploring their options or contem-
plating their bid increment.
7 Conclusions
In situations where bidders have different additive or
super-additive private valuations, academic literature has
shown that CAs have the edge over (sequential) single item
auctions. However, CAs introduce two problems: the
coordination problem and the threshold problem. The
coordination problem arises when bidders fail to identify
bids that are individually profitable and collectively com-
plementary. The threshold problem represents the next
problem: even when individually profitable and collec-
tively complementary packages are identified, and the
coordination problem is essentially overcome, the problem
of determining bid prices still remains. This is further
complicated by free-rider incentives. Naturally, these
problems are of significant practical interest.
We design types of feedback dubbed coalitional feed-
back to help bidders overcome coordination and threshold
problems. We put different types of feedback to the test in
a laboratory setting with human bidders, using iterative
CAs. There are many ways coalitional feedback can be
implemented: the number of messages could be limited,
bid suggestions may be based on different ways of splitting
the required increment over the coalition members, the
feedback might be binding and function as a bid price rule,
etc. While conceptually similar, these differences in
implementation might result in different effects, depending
on the auction setting (e.g., small vs. large auctions), which
makes them an interesting topic for future research.
In line with Adomavicius et al. (2012), we find that bid
states feedback is a big improvement upon outcome feed-
back, both with respect to economic efficiency and auction
revenue. We find that coalitional feedback offers further
improvements, leading to higher efficiencies as well as
higher bidder profits, when threshold problems are difficult.
The advantages include reducing the complexity bidders
face with package bidding and enabling bidders to focus
more on relevant packages. Furthermore, they can adjust
their bid prices smartly, considering both the coalitional
winning levels and the number of coalitions. We conclude
that confronted with a difficult threshold problem, bidders
are not insensitive to bid price suggestions and tend to
follow such suggestions readily. This is interesting, as it
appears that the free-rider aspect is at least diminished by
coalitional feedback.
We learned that two factors are important for coalitional
feedback to have an added value compared to bid states
feedback. First, coalitional feedback works well if it sug-
gests a price increment which is lower than the private
valuation, while the winning level is higher than the private
valuation. On the other hand, when the latter is below the
private valuation, coalition feedback may have an adverse
effect. Second, coalitional feedback has more potential
impact when it goes out to bidders, who at the time of
receiving the feedback do not have a provisionally winning
bid. We have witnessed this particularly in cases with a
high threshold problem.
This paper shows what can potentially be achieved using
coalitional feedback. Whether or not such feedback can be
implemented in practice may however depend on other
considerations. Indeed, feedback is information, which will
allow bidders to learn about the preferences and behaviour
of other (rivaling) bidders. Despite being helpful in terms
of economic efficiency or bidder profits, this could be
perceived as inappropriate in some practical settings.
While our research has mainly been done with human
bidders in mind, the (factual) coalitional feedback can also
be offered to automated bidding agents. An automated
bidding agent bids on behalf of a human bidder, according
to some bidding strategy and after having learned the
preferences of the human bidder. Clearly, coalitional
feedback offers automated bidding agents objective infor-
mation on the coalitions in which it features and the
threshold that needs to be bridged by each of these coali-
tions. How automated bidding agents could best use this
information to determine which packages are the most
interesting to pursue, and how to improve current auto-
mated bidding strategies to take this into account are
interesting questions for further research.
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